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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S

outh African immigration policy has become extremely
restrictive since 1994. Immigration numbers are at an all-time
low, even as emigration accelerates. The number of temporary
work permits issued has also declined at a time when South
Africa has reconnected to the global economy and many
companies and investors wish to import high-level skills. Immigration is
not viewed as a public policy tool that could benefit South Africa.
Immigrants and migrants (even the most highly skilled) are more often
stereotyped as a threat to the economic and social interests of South
Africans.
Why has South Africa’s first democratic government taken such a
dim view of immigration to date? Why is immigration invariably seen as
a problem to control rather than an opportunity to exploit? Why has
South Africa shifted from being a net immigrant-receiving to an immigrant-exporting nation? These are the first questions addressed in this
paper. We address the Draft White Paper’s rationale for a restrictionist
policy and review various other explanations that have been advanced
to explain post-apartheid policy.
International experience suggests that skilled immigrants and
migrants make important contributions to any country’s economic
growth and development. Immigrants can fill the gaps created by emigrating skills or the inadequacies of a country’s education and training
system. Even more important, skilled immigrants bring innovation to
the economy through new ideas and skills. In this regard, there needs to
be greater awareness of the profile and contribution of South Africa’s
current stock of skilled immigrants.
Studies of skilled immigrants in other countries have shown that
they rarely fit the popular negative stereotypes. There is no reason why
this should not be true for South Africa as well. One way to assess the
potential value to South Africa of a more open attitude towards skilled
migration and immigration, is to examine the existing immigration population. If these immigrants conform to the negative stereotypes, there
is reason for caution. If, on the other hand, they are making a valuable
contribution then the case is strengthened for further immigration. This
paper therefore profiles South Africa’s skilled immigrant population:
who are these immigrants? When did they come to South Africa? Are
there significant differences between pre-1990 and post-1990 immigrants? And how do they perceive and experience living in South
Africa?
The paper is based on a detailed survey of 400 skilled foreign nationals in South Africa using face-to-face interviews. The survey provided
1
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the following profile of South Africa’s skilled immigrant population:
• Reflecting South Africa’s pre-1994 immigration policies, the
major source region is clearly Europe (47%) and the most
important source country, the United Kingdom (31%). But as
many as 41% of the sample were from elsewhere in Africa (with
18% from the SADC region and 23% from other countries).
This points to a newer, post-1990 trend in South Africa’s immigration experience; the movement of skilled Africans (as immigrants and asylum seekers) to the country following the demise
of apartheid.
• Nearly 73% of South Africa’s skilled immigrants from Europe
entered before 1991. In contrast, some 87% of non-SADC
African respondents entered after 1991, highlighting the recency of South Africa’s reconnection to the rest of the continent.
SADC-country citizens are about evenly split between the two,
indicating that the brain drain from neighbouring states began
before the formal end of apartheid.
• Three quarters of skilled non-citizens (mainly whites) who have
been in the country since before mid-1991 are permanent residents. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of skilled
non-citizens (mainly blacks) who entered after 1991 (91%) are
temporary residents on work permits. Nearly 80% of white
skilled residents have permanent residence status compared to
only 44% of African non-citizens. A restrictionist immigration
policy has done little to correct historical inequalities. White
non-citizens enjoy rights and privileges that black non-citizens
have difficulty accessing.
• The vast majority of skilled immigrants in South Africa were in
full-time employment at home before they left. While we cannot discount improved job opportunities and prospects as a
motive for migration, it is clear that unemployment per se is not
the reason why skilled immigrants leave their home country and
come to South Africa.
Most of South Africa’s skilled immigrant population can therefore be
put into one of two groups: (a) white immigrants who entered before
1994 with the security and other rights conferred by permanent residence and (b) black immigrants (more exactly migrants) who have temporary residence status only. The question therefore arises as to what
linkages skilled migrants and immigrants maintain with home and their
degree of commitment to South Africa:
• Many non-citizens maintain tangible links with home. One half
of the respondents still have a bank account in their home
country, 35% still own a house and 34% have investments
2
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there. Very few appear to have cut all ties, with only 12% saying
they “never” return home. On the other hand, only 16% return
home often. Most do so on an irregular basis. Africans are far
less likely to do so even though their destinations are closer.
These patterns are not unusual. In a transnational world many
contemporary immigrants maintain strong and active backward
linkages. This does not mean that they are uncommitted to
their country of new residence.
• Only 7% of those with temporary residence and work permits
have applied for permanent residence. Is this because they are
uninterested or because they see no point in applying since the
likelihood of being granted permanent residence is slight?
Almost half (45%) said that they would want to become permanent residents if they could, indicating that there is a significant
interest in a more lasting commitment to South Africa.
• South Africa’s skilled non-citizens, both black and white, are
highly qualified with 93% holding a post-secondary qualification
(and 15% a post-graduate degree. There is a very strong trend
for post-1991 arrivals to be better educated. Almost 70% of
skilled non-citizens with university degrees and 60% with postgraduate training arrived after 1991. This finding clearly contradicts the idea that the “quality” of immigrants to South Africa
has been in decline. Under apartheid, a white skin was the usual
passport to entry. Under the new dispensation, skills and value
have become much more important determinants.
• Skilled non-citizens are high wage earners with 25% earning
more than R20,000 per month, and 59% earning more than
R10,000 per month. White immigrants tend to earn more, on
average, that black.
The survey showed that skilled non-citizens are very satisfied with
their personal economic conditions in South Africa, access to health
care and quality schooling, and the cost of living. This extends across
respondents from differing areas of origin. They are much less satisfied
with the standard of services available in South Africa. Finally, there is
an overwhelming concern about the lack of personal and family safety.
Black non-citizens are far more positive about the future than white,
reflecting the same division between white and black South Africans.
Several policy-related conclusions and recommendations can be
drawn from this research.
• “Brain drain” pessimism has focused mainly on the exit of skills
from South Africa with little focus on what South Africa can do
to attract more skilled workers from abroad or to keep those who
are already here. Lurking behind much of this one-sided focus is
3
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the misguided assumption that national development and skills
in-migration are incompatible. In fact, the opposite is the case.
• There are clearly very important changes afoot in the composition of the skilled foreign workforce in South Africa. Compared
to the situation just a decade ago when a similar survey would
have been hard pressed to find significant numbers of black
skilled workers from the rest of Africa, 41% of this sample were
from Africa. This seems to suggest that South Africa is in a position to capitalize on its comparative developmental advantages
over the rest of the continent as an attractive destination for
skilled workers.
• At the moment, skilled Africans are widely satisfied with South
Africa, and fairly optimistic about its future. What is required to
keep them is, first and foremost, a change in their treatment at
the hands of ordinary South Africans and their government. In
this regard, the problem of keeping skilled Africans appears to
be the same problem confronting the formulation of a more
rational immigration policy in general: xenophobia, intolerance
and discrimination against foreigners, particularly those from the
rest of Africa.
• South Africa has an important opportunity to enter the global
market for skilled migrants and immigrants. Further prevarication and suspicion is counter-productive. In the last year, the
Minister of Home Affairs has responded to criticism of government policy by proposing a relaxation of rules of entry for skilled
immigrants. This has not yet translated into practical policy
measures. The new Immigration Bill will produce a new regulatory framework but does not, of itself, guarantee any change
unless there is the political will and a changed mindset.
We recommend that the ANC government articulate a position on
skilled immigration as a matter of priority. Implementation of immigration policy is rightly a line function of the Home Affairs Minister. But it
cannot simply be assumed that his views are necessarily those of the
ANC. Is the ANC, for example, prepared to endorse and work to
implement the Minister’s new stance on skilled migration, as articulated
in the Immigration Bill and various public speeches? If so, a major
change in South Africa’s restrictionist immigration policy is inevitable.

4
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The Department cannot, in the light of the grave unemployment situation in the country, grant work permits to
aliens who do not possess special skills or qualifications not
readily available in the Republic of South Africa, thereby
depriving South African citizens and other permanent
residents of their just expectations of earning a livelihood
(Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi 1996).

On the immigration policy I would say that the
Department’s functions regarding international migration
relate to the control over the admission of aliens to their
residence in and departure from the Republic. The existing
immigration policy is first and foremost directed towards
the protection of the interest of the sovereign worker and
creation of employment opportunities
(Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi, 1996).

In South Africa, we need to acquire large numbers of
skilled people to support our economic growth, for we are
aware that only through economic growth will our country
be able to provide a long-term solution to its severe social
problems. However, the relocation to South Africa of
skilled people on a temporary or permanent basis is often
perceived as threatening scarcely available job opportunities for our nationals. Obviously, this might be true in the
short term in respect of specific or even anecdotal situations. However, in a country such ours which is still on its
way towards development, the macroeconomic impact of
additional skills leads to greater employment generation
and the broadening of the economic basis (Home Affairs
Minister Buthelezi 2000).

5
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INTRODUCTION

S

outh African immigration policy has become increasingly
restrictive since 1994. South African and multi-national
employees seeking to introduce foreign skills on a temporary
basis have also become increasingly frustrated and critical of
government. Immigration is not viewed as a public policy tool
that could benefit South Africa. Rather, immigrants and migrants (even
the most highly skilled) are more often stereotyped as a threat to the
economic and social interests of South Africans.
Why has South Africa’s first democratic government taken such a
dim view of immigration to date? Why is immigration invariably seen as
a problem to control rather than an opportunity to exploit? Why has
South Africa shifted from being a net immigrant-receiving to an immigrant-exporting nation?
The official position seems to be that immigration should be treated
with great circumspection since it has the potential to exacerbate South
Africa’s employment problem by taking jobs away from South Africans.
The recent Draft White Paper on International Migration suggests
three possible reasons why South Africa should be wary of immigration,
none of which are particularly convincing.1
First, the White Paper argues that South Africa has too many people
and too high a population density to sustain its existing population.
This outdated neo-Mathusian argument takes no account of the real
determinants of a country’s ability to support its population: its natural
and human resource base, its global competitiveness, its economic policies, and many other factors. There are a great many countries with
much higher population densities than South Africa who are considerably better off.
Second, there is a tendency to think that every position occupied by
a non-South Africa is one job less for a South African. Immigration is
therefore deemed to undermine the state’s affirmative action policies
which are supposed to open up new job opportunities for black South
Africans.
But consider the following scenario: a foreign company is considering investing in South Africa but to operate effectively in a global market, the company wishes to import 100 skilled non-South Africans.
They apply to Home Affairs and are told that those 100 jobs must go to
South Africans. The company therefore decides to locate its operation
in Argentina instead. The result is that the 5,000 new jobs that the
company would have generated for South Africans go to Argentina as
well.
Third, immigrants are viewed as likely to be a drain and burden on

6
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the state. On the contrary, most international evidence suggests that
skilled migrants, in particular, are a major economic boon to a country.
They are far more likely to add energy, innovation and jobs to an economy than steal them from locals. There is therefore no evidence and little logic to the argument that South Africans are economically better
off because of the country’s restrictive immigration policy.
However, even if we reject these arguments, the fact remains that
existing policy is restrictive, begging the question of why this should be,
given that South Africa was a major immigrant-recruiting nation before
the 1990s. Several inter-related reasons have been advanced for postapartheid South Africa’s adoption of a restrictionist policy on legal
immigration and migration:2
• The legacy of South Africa’s racially-sullied immigration
history.3 Under white rule, legal immigration was confined to
whites only, primarily from Western Europe. This policy was not
officially removed from the statute books until 1991. Black people from the rest of Africa were allowed legal entry to South
Africa only under strictly controlled conditions - usually as
migrant contract workers who were required to return home as
soon as their employment ended. Immigration is therefore associated in many minds with South Africa’s racist past and is seen
as of little relevance to the new state.
• South Africa’s newly-inclusive nation-building project and the
impact of new nationalism.4 This process has placed great
emphasis on defining the boundaries of citizenship and membership. The corollary of this process is identification and exclusion
of those “who do not belong.” Africans who had lived side-byside with black South Africans before 1994 found themselves
increasingly alienated thereafter. South Africa has no policy of
immigrant integration and no vision of a national identity that
would welcome and embrace new members.
• Popular and policy confusion between migration and immigration, and between legal and unauthorized migrants and immigrants.5 Since 1990, South Africa has had to confront an
increasing flow of undocumented migrants to the country.
Although the extent of this movement is often highly exaggerated, it has led to a moral panic and policy obsession with controlling and deporting “illegal aliens.” Legal immigration tends
to be lumped together with undocumented migration and is
tainted by association. At best, the idea that legal immigration
might benefit the country is relegated to the policy backburner.
• The impact of public, media and official xenophobia.6 Research
has clearly demonstrated that an anti-immigration policy enjoys
7
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broad public support. Almost 1 in 4 South Africans would be
happy if no non-citizens came to the country at all. Over 65%
favour a highly restrictionist entry policy and draconian
response. South African hostility to immigration is not, the surveys also show, based on rejection of the potential benefits of
legal immigration; indeed, there is widespread ignorance about
what these might be. What this means is that a shift in policy
direction, even the tentative one proposed in the White Paper,
requires political leadership, changed media attitudes and serious
public education.
This paper examines South Africa’s anti-immigrationist policy in the
context of the associated debate on the “brain drain.” This debate has
focused to date almost obsessively on the emigration of skilled South
Africans from the country.7 But skilled emigration is only one side of
the story. Before we reach firm conclusions about whether South Africa
is experiencing a net loss of skilled labour, the volume of that loss, and
its impact on the South African economy, needs to be weighed against
the numbers and types of skilled non-South Africans living in and
immigrating to South Africa.
Skilled immigrants and migrants make important contributions to
any country’s economic growth and development.8 Immigrants can fill
the gaps created by emigrating skills or the inadequacies of a country’s
education and training system. Even more important, skilled immigrants
bring innovation to the economy through new ideas and skills.9 This is
seldom recognized in the anti-immigration discourse of post-apartheid
South Africa.
In order to shift the debate so that skills immigration is not perceived as a universal evil by South Africans and its real potential is realistically debated and assessed, several things need to happen.
First, there needs to be far more precise documentation of the extent
of the skills lost through brain drain. A recent study by the South
African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) project at UCT claims
that official statistics on emigration are far too low, by as much as twothirds.10 Official statistics on emigration count self-declared émigrés, and
do not capture those who might leave permanently under the pretext
of, or subsequent to, a temporary visit.11
Second, the brain drain and brain gain issues need to be disconnected. Immigration needs to be viewed not simply as a means to fill some
actual or hypothetical gap caused by emigration but as a policy tool in
its own right. Immigration, properly planned and managed, can do
much more for South Africa than simply plug the gap.
Third, there needs to be greater awareness of the profile and contribution of South Africa’s current stock of skilled immigrants. Studies of
8
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skilled immigrants in other countries have shown that they rarely fit the
popular stereotypes. There is no reason why this should not be true for
South Africa as well.
Finally, there is a clear need for bold political leadership on the
immigration question. In a climate of antagonism and public hostility
towards non-citizens, the benefits of controlled immigration and migration to South Africa must be clearly articulated and marketed. In this
respect, the Minister of Home Affairs has recently begun to recognize
this reality in public.
However, his cannot be an isolated voice. The ANC needs to clarify
whether its own policy position on immigration advocates continued
restrictionism or greater flexibility.12
This paper aims to profile South Africa’s current skilled immigrant
population. The analysis addresses the following questions: (a) who are
these immigrants? (b) when did they come to South Africa? (c) are
there significant differences between pre-1990 and post-1990 immigrants? and (d) how do they perceive and experience the xenophobic
smog which is said to blanket much of the country? The primary intention is to demystify the contribution that non-citizens are making to the
country and to suggest that an anti-immigrationist policy on skilled
migration is not in the country’s best interests.13

9
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A NATION OF EMIGRANTS?

B

efore the 1990s, South Africa was usually classified as an
“immigrant-receiving nation”?14 According to official statistics, the country consistently experienced net immigration
gains up until 1994; interrupted only during periods of political upheaval and large-scale emigration in 1960-1961
(Sharpeville), 1977-1979 (Soweto), and 1986-1988 (the States of
Emergency) (Figure 1).

Figure 1: South African Migration: Net Official Gains and Losses,
1940-1998
50
40
30
20
10
0

1994
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-10

Source: Central Statistical Services (1994), Tourism and Migration (1993), Central Statistical Services (1995), Tourism and Migration 1995

Official immigration figures show that until the 1980s, Western
Europe (and Great Britain in particular) was the major sources of immigrants to South Africa. The peak decade for European immigration was
1965 to 1975, when 300,000 immigrants entered the country (Table 1).
European immigration fell sharply after 1985. African immigration prior
to the 1970s was primarily of whites from other countries to the north.
The peak period coincides with white flight from independence in
Africa.
In the 1980s, South Africa’s immigration stream became somewhat
more diverse. With the nominal “independence” of the homelands of
Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, skills were imported from a more
10
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Table 1: Immigration to South Africa by Source Region, 1926-1995
Europe

Africa

Asia

Americas

Oceania

1926-30

30,871

791

742

746

511

1931-35

18,537

1,130

464

766

508

1936-40

30,896

1,596

845

1,369

841

1941-45

5,422

928

417

328

198

1946-50

91,573

4,027

3,438

1,865

1,189

1951-55

70,242

7,841

1,375

1,576

637

1956-60

48,857

14,187

1,423

1,386

654

1961-65

89,658

58,231

2,563

2,734

1,189

1966-70

157,087

44,418

2,918

3,218

2,511

1971-75

142,584

27,838

2,754

3,666

3,843

1976-80

76,381

50,343

2,189

2,441

2,428

1981-85

98,191

58,603

3,136

2,837

1,278

1986-90

28,189

13,946

4,730

2,422

554

1991-95

18,999

8,474

12,462

1,890

498

Source: S. Peberdy, “Selecting Immigrants”

diverse range of sources, including Asia, SADC and the rest of Africa.
In the 1980s significant numbers of Taiwanese immigrants were also
welcomed by the apartheid government as part of the Bantustan industrialization strategy.
Officially, South Africa remained a net immigration country during
the tumultuous transition years from 1990 to 1994. However, this picture is misleading since official figures seriously under-estimate the
extent of emigration. The official net immigration losses of the period
since 1994 similarly fail to reveal the full extent of the deficit (Figure 1).
Official South African data on emigration can be compared with
that for the five major recipient countries of South Africans - the UK,
the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.15 Since South Africa’s
data capture methods rely on self-disclosure of emigration, they are less
likely to be accurate than data from recipient countries. There is consistent underreporting in the South African data (Table 2).
The magnitude of the discrepancy increases over time, perhaps indicating not only that more people are leaving but that they are less willing to report it. In sum, an estimated 233,609 people left South Africa
to settle abroad in these five countries between 1989 and 1997. The
official figure for these countries, as reported by SSA, is only 82,811.
There is thus significant under-reporting of emigration in official South
African statistics: only 35% of the emigration stream was captured by
official data-collection methods.
11
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Table 2: South African Emigration to Five Major Recipient Countries, 1987-199716
1987

1988

1989

1990 1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Total

NZ Data 632

246

209

202

223

422

2 054

2 638 2 046

2 648

2 689

14 009

SA Data 411

176

83

64

50

126

242

1 465 939

1 266

1 157

5 979

Aus Data 3 792

3 024

2 424

2 084 1 274

1 021

1 654

2 792 3 190

3 211

4 281

28 747

SA Data 3 484

2 588

1 275

1 292 928

694

1 309

1 298 1 507

1 767

1 508

17 650

UK Data 6 700

7 000

11 700 6 400 8 000

6 900

9 400

8 100 4 200

11 400 10 988 90 788

SA Data 3 817

2 295

1 420

1 804 1 800

1 987

3 716

2 880 2 045

2 243

2 162

26 169

Can Data 1 748

1 672

1 558

1 083 1 014

1 141

1 822

2 910 1 753

1 526

1 898

18 125

SA Data 755

722

454

349

285

566

947

774

557

6 354

266

679

US Data 1 741

1 832

1 899

1 990 1 854

2 516

2 197

2 144 2 560

2 966

2 563

46 724

SA Data 543

325

174

278

314

566

752

963

832

5 936

307

882

Source: Brown, Kaplan and Meyer, “Brain Drain.”

One of the reasons that immigration has been increasingly outstripped by emigration is because immigration policy has become
increasingly restrictive since 1994.

POST-APARTHEID IMMIGRATION POLICY
Official statistics for immigration are a great deal more reliable than those
for emigration.
The new, post-apartheid restrictionist attitude towards immigration
has affected flows in two main ways: first, the numbers of people being
allowed to legally immigrate to South Africa has fallen consistently
since 1994 (Table 3). The argument that this is because few people wish
to emigrate to South Africa is almost certainly incorrect. With limited
opportunity for legal immigration, South Africa’s skills base has ironically been augmented by undocumented immigration and official corruption.17 This is the regrettable downside of the absence of a proactive
immigration policy. South Africa’s economy is also relatively developed
in comparison to the rest of the continent and to much of the “third
world.” Thus, South Africa has comparative advantages that make it a
preferred destination for many skilled workers.
Second, the new restrictionism has affected temporary skills import.
The official figures indicate that the number of work permits issued to
foreign temporary residents increased during the 1990s but has fallen
consistently since 1996 (Table 4). The 1998 figure was the lowest for
many years. Employers have been frustrated and blocked at almost every
turn as they seek to import high-level skills from outside the country.
This discontent has swelled into a torrent of criticism over the last year
12
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Table 3: Immigration to South Africa by Source Region, 1990-1998
Total

Europe

Africa

Asia

Other

1990

14,449

7,560

1,628

2,837

2,474

1991

12,379

5,767

2,065

3,650

897

1992

8,686

3,869

1,266

3,005

546

1993

9,824

4,541

1,701

3,165

417

1994

6,398

2,784

1,628

1,645

342

1995

5,064

2,272

1,343

1,063

386

1996

5,407

2,315

1,601

1,137

454

1997

4,352

1,630

1,281

1,148

473

1998

4,371

1,614

1,169

1,207

381

Source: DHA Annual Reports

as the policy has seriously interfered with the economic plans and operations of key enterprises. There are signs that the message is getting
through and a loosening of restrictions has been promised. However,
the new Draft Immigration Bill proposes a new system that is bureaucratically cumbersome and may simply exacerbate the situation further.18

DEFINING SKILLED IMMIGRATION
The systematic study of skilled immigration faces various difficulties.
Definitions of the term “skilled”, for example, vary considerably. Most
researchers tend to focus on people who have received some sort of specialized training that results in superior technical competence, talent, or
abilities that are applied in professional occupations. Without these people, the operation and development of the economy would be severely
hindered. But is this definition really adequate? A survey of skilled nonTable 4: Temporary Residence Permits, 1990-1998
New

Renewals

Total

1990

7,657

30,915

38,571

1991

4,117

32,763

36,880

1992

5,581

33,318

38,899

1993

5,741

30,810

36,551

1994

8,714

29,352

38,066

1995

11,053

32,838

43,891

1996

19,498

33,206

52,704

1997

11,361

17,129

28,490

1998

10,828

11,207

22,035

Source: DHA Annual Reports
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citizens in South Africa needs to approach a broader range of people than
this typical popular image might imply.
First, the term “brain drain” certainly implies a depletion of the
functional core of the economy. In business, the functional core is simply a subgroup of key personnel in an organization who are critical to
the normal conduct of economic activity. The functional core of an
economy therefore does not only consist of people with post-graduate
degrees, in well-paying, high level corporate positions. It is also sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education,
have worked their way up the corporate ladder or have started their
own successful businesses
Second, the skills pool should include people at various stages of the
corporate ladder. National economic performance will begin to breakdown not only when businesses lose a certain number of senior managers, but when they cross a specific threshold of loss of middle-level
personnel who fill vital administrative and support functions. Middlelevel personnel also comprise the potential pool from which to fill
senior positions in the future.
Third, the skills pool includes entrepreneurs, not simply those in
corporate structures. The self-employed create jobs, add innovation, and
contribute to the overall growth of the economy. The pool also includes
people from science, technology, education and arts and culture who
contribute to the functional core of the economy by training skilled
workers, contributing technological and scientific innovation, and sustaining the entertainment and tourist industries.
Because of these definitional issues and problems with official data,
nobody is sure exactly how many skilled non-citizens actually live in
South Africa. There is also no precise knowledge of where they reside or
work. This makes it impossible to draw scientific, representative samples.
To obtain information which is as valid and reliable as possible in
the circumstances, an area-controlled quota sample of 400 skilled foreign nationals in the country was interviewed.19 Face-to-face interviews
were conducted in the Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban metropolitan
areas. Many no doubt also reside in other metropolitan and rural areas,
but due to the immense difficulty and cost in locating them, the survey
was limited to the three metropolitan areas.20
Almost two out of every three (61%) sample respondents fitting the
criteria were found in the greater Johannesburg region (Table 5). Some
22% were in the Cape Town area and 18% in Durban. African skilled
migrants (at 83%) were even more concentrated in Gauteng than those
from other regions.
The profile of the sample selected for this study of skilled immigrants
should, if any way representative, reflect South Africa’s diverse
14
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Table 5: Spatial Distribution of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Province

Total

Western*

African

Other

Gauteng

61

44

83

52

Western Cape

22

32

9

24

Kwazulu-Natal

18

24

9

24

(N=400)* Citizen of European and North American countries

immigration history. This proved to be the case. In the survey sample,
the major source region was clearly Europe (47%) and the most important source country, the United Kingdom (31%); a clear legacy of South
Africa’s racist past (Tables 6 and 7).
South Africa’s more recent history of immigrant diversification is
also clearly reflected in the sample. As many as 41% of the sample were
from elsewhere in Africa (with 18% from the SADC region and 23%
from other countries). The snowball sample method picked up respondents from 10 African countries with Nigeria and the DRC prominent
outside SADC, and Zimbabwe within.
The fact that almost a quarter of the sample were from non-SADC
African countries points to a newer, post-1990 trend in South Africa’s
immigration experience; the movement of skilled Africans (as immigrants and asylum seekers) to the country following the demise of
apartheid. The relatively high proportion of African respondents, in
comparison with overall immigration figures (Table 7), is a function of
the fact that the survey identified many skilled African respondents
who enjoy only temporary residence status in South Africa.
For purposes of internal comparison, the sample can be divided in
various ways. First, comparisons are possible between the older, primarily European, stream of immigrants and the newer breed of African
(im)migrant. The former are associated with the population engineering
of apartheid immigration policy. Nearly 73% of South Africa’s skilled
Table 6: Origin of Skilled Immigrants
Region of Origin

%

Western Europe

47

Rest of Africa

23

Southern Africa

18

North America

4

Asia/ Far East

3

Eastern Europe

3

Australasia

1

Other

2

For this and all subsequent tables, percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. (N=400)
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Table 7:Citizenship of Skilled Immigrants
Country of Citizenship

N

%

Britain

123

31

Nigeria

32

8

Germany

22

6

Zimbabwe

15

4

DRC

21

5

Netherlands

16

4

Ireland

11

3

United States

9

2

Malawi

9

2

Zambia

9

2

Ghana

9

2

Portugal

8

2

Lesotho

8

2

Uganda

8

2

Botswana

8

2

Swaziland

6

2

Belgium

6

2

Canada

5

1

Austria

4

1

Cuba

4

1

Kenya

4

1

Only countries with at least 1% listed (N=400)

residents from Europe entered South Africa before 1991 (Table 8). The
latter, increasingly global, movement is associated with the new opportunities and attractions of post-apartheid South Africa.
As Table 8 also shows, 87% of non-SADC African respondents
entered the country after 1991, highlighting the recency of South
Africa’s reconnection to the rest of the continent. SADC-country citizens are about evenly split between the two, indicating that the brain
drain from neighbouring states began before the formal end of
apartheid, and has continued since.
A second point of comparison therefore is between “old” and “new”
immigrants. We use the year 1991 as the nominal divide between old
(apartheid) and new (post-apartheid) immigrant movements. The former group is predominantly European but includes some African and
Asian immigrants who entered under the banner of the country’s late
apartheid policies. The latter group is predominantly African, but
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Table 8: Place of Origin of Immigrants by Length of Residence (%)
Europe
Rest of
Southern
Africa
Africa

Other

Total

Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)

27.1

86.9

53.4

73.6

49.1

More than 8 years (before mid 1991)

72.9

13.1

46.5

36.8

51.2

N=

199

92

71

38

400

includes Europeans and other skilled personnel associated with the postapartheid influx of foreign capital to the country.
The final point of comparison is between permanent residents
(“immigrants”) and temporary residents (“migrants”). As Table 9 clearly
shows, three quarters of skilled non-citizens who have been in the country since before mid-1991 are permanent residents. On the other hand,
the overwhelming majority of skilled non-citizens who entered after
1991 (91%) are temporary residents on work permits. Nearly 80% of
western skilled residents have permanent residence status compared to
only 44% of African non-citizens. The impact of a restrictionist immigration policy on the degree of commitment and permanence of noncitizens seems obvious, although it could be that the modern, skilled
worker is less interested in permanent residence.
Comparisons are useful for a number of reasons. First, they provide
valuable insights into the character, skills, attitudes and behaviours of
old versus new immigrants. Second, we can test the pervasive assumption in South Africa that the rest of the continent has little to offer;
certainly its citizens are often stereotyped in the media and on the
streets in predominantly negative terms. Third, the reality is that South
Africa is currently a more attractive permanent immigration destination
for Africans than it is for people from Europe. If South Africa were to
adopt a more open policy towards skilled immigration, Africa would be
a major source of potential immigrants (as happened fleetingly in the
early 1990s). It is therefore useful to know something about the new
African immigrants already in South Africa.21

COMPARING OLD AND NEW IMMIGRATION
A systematic comparison of the old and new foreign skilled populations of
South Africa reveals some distinctive differences. First, their residential
Table 9: Residence Status of Immigrants (%)

Up to 8 years (since mid 1991)

Permanent Residence Work Permit

Total

24.6

49.1

91.1

More than 8 years (before mid 1991)

75.5

9.2

51.2

N=

253

147

400
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geography is distinctively different (Table 10), with old immigrants clustering in Cape Town and Durban, while new immigrants are found in
absolute and proportionally greater numbers in the economic heartland of
the Greater Johannesburg area.
Second, the sample reveals the distinctive gender characteristics of
western and African skilled migrants. Both populations are predominantly male (Table 11). However, the western sample had proportionally more females. Much old immigration was of the family variety. The
training and mobility of skilled Africans in their home countries
remains male-dominated.
Third, in terms of formal educational qualifications, there is little
obvious difference between African and western non-citizens. Table 12
shows that both populations are highly qualified in formal terms.
However, there is a much greater difference in the qualifications of
old and new immigrants. As Table 13 shows, there is a strong trend for
more recent, post-1991, arrivals to be better educated. Almost 70% of
skilled non-citizens with university degrees and 60% with post-graduate
training arrived after 1991. This finding clearly contradicts the idea that
the “quality” of immigrants to South Africa has been in decline. Under
Table 10: Place of Residence of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Greater JHB

Cape Town

Durban

Total

Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)

64.0

29.8

21.1

49.1

More than 8 years (before mid-1991)

35.9

69.9

78.9

51.2

N=

242

87

71

400

Western

African

Other

Table 11: Gender of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Gender

Total

Male

68

61

79

64

Female

32

39

21

36

(N=400)

Table 12: Educational Qualifications of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Educational Qualification

Total

Western

African

Other

Less than High School Certificate (HSC)

1

1

0

0

HSC only, or equivalent

7

11

1

4

HSC plus a diploma or Bachelors degree

68

61

74

84

Honours degree

10

10

10

0

Masters degree

12

12

14

4

Doctorate

3

4

1

8

(N=400)
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apartheid, a white skin was the usual passport to entry. Under the new
dispensation, skills and value have become much more important determinants.
Fourth, despite the similar educational profile of western and African
skilled residents and the superior profile of post-1991 entrants, the earning potential of the two groups varies considerably (Table 14). Western
skilled residents tend to have higher incomes than their African counterparts. For example, some 63% of skilled Africans earn less than
R10,000 a month (compared with only 24% of westerners). Again, a
third of Africans, but only 10% of westerners, earn less than R6,000 a
month. In part, this is a function of natural career progression (with
long-time immigrants tending to earn more than newcomers in any
context). But there are obvious racial legacies here. Any white immigrant in the old South Africa immediately enjoyed job and promotion
preference over a black counterpart.
Fifth, the survey provided useful insights into the occupational distribution of skilled migrants. Nine-in-ten (90%) skilled non-citizens interviewed work full-time. One quarter (26%) work for themselves fulltime, but only a very small proportion in the informal sector (5%)
(Table 15). Very few came to South Africa because of unemployment
Table 13: Qualifications of Skilled Immigrants (%)
High School HS +
or less

Bachelor’s Post-Graduate Total
Degree

Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)

16.1

31.7

69.1

58.2

49.1

More than 8 years (before mid-1991) 83.9

68.4

31.1

41.8

51.2

N=

287

30

58

400

25

Table 14: Income of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Income

Total

Western

African

Other

R2001 to R6000

19

10

32

12

R6001 to R8 000

14

9

21

4

R8001 to R10 000

7

5

10

8

R10 001 to R14 000

16

17

15

20

R14 001 to R20 000

18

23

11

28

R20 001 to R26 000

11

13

6

12

R26 001 to R32 000

5

10

3

0

R32 001 to R38 000

2

2

1

4

More than R38 000

5

9

1

4

Refused to answer

2

2

0

8

(N=400)
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back home. Only 2% were unemployed before they left, and another
7% worked part time. As many as 63% were in full-time employment
when they left. Another one quarter (24%) were still students when
they left.
Skilled non-citizens are spread fairly broadly across various sectors of
the South African economy. The largest proportion (31%) work in the
service industry, followed by professional practitioners – law, medicine
and engineering – (25%). With regard to employment status and occupation, there is actually no major difference according to region of origin. New migrants are disproportionately represented in the medical,
educational, financial and research and technical fields. They are underrepresented in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. This may
simply be a reflection of a lack of demand in industry, although this
argument is difficult to sustain in the face of persistent complaints from
business about the bureaucratic difficulties of accessing non-South
African labour (Table 16).

DISCOURAGING PERMANENCE
One of the most striking features of post-1994 immigration policy has
been the hostility to the permanent, and even temporary, import of skills
from outside. There is a pervasive but highly misleading assumption that
every job occupied by a non-citizen is one job less for a South African.
This fallacy has produced a policy environment that favours limiting skills
in-migration, and temporary over permanent settlement. This contrasts
markedly with apartheid policy where (white) permanent immigration
and assimilation were encouraged and promoted.
How transient are South Africa’s skilled non-citizens? The first way
to answer the question is to examine their continuing economic commitments to their country of origin. Non-citizens who maintain tangible
links to their home countries have a much greater potential ability and
likelihood of returning. One half (50%) of the respondents still have a
Table 15: Employment Status of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Employment Status

Total

Western

African

Other

Employed – Full time

64

60

71

55

Employed – Part time

8

5

10

16

Entrepreneur in Formal Sector – Full time

21

27

13

24

Entrepreneur in Formal Sector – Part time

2

3

1

0

Entrepreneur in Informal Sector – Full time

5

5

4

6

Entrepreneur in Informal Sector – Part time

1

1

1

0

(N=400)
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Table 16: Employment Sector of Skilled Immigrants (%)
Employment field/ Sector

Total

Western

African

Other

Education / Research

14

10

18

12

Secondary education

3

1

7

0

Primary education

1

1

1

0

Tertiary education

6

4

7

8

Research

4

4

3

4

Heavy industry

17

19

15

12

Manufacturing

8

10

4

12

Textile

2

1

3

0

Construction

3

4

3

0

Mining

<1

0

1

0

Automotive

3

3

3

0

Steel & iron

1

2

1

0

Service industry

31

37

20

32

Retail

8

10

4

12

Real estate

2

3

0

0

Energy

1

1

0

0

Food

6

7

3

12

Transport

2

1

4

0

Marine / Shipping

1

1

0

0

Private security

1

0

1

0

Service

5

7

3

0

Computer / Information technology

2

1

4

4

Tourism / Hotel industry

1

2

0

0

Arts / Entertainment / Sport

2

2

1

4

Telecommunications

0

1

0

0

Media

0

1

0

0

Professional practice

25

20

30

24

Medical

10

6

15

12

Engineering

13

13

12

12

Law firm

2

1

3

0

Finance / Banking

11

10

12

12

Accounting

3

1

6

4

Finance

3

3

3

4

Banking

1

1

1

4

Insurance

2

1

2

0

Marketing / Commerce

2

4

0

0

Government / Military

4

2

8

8

Government

4

2

7

8

Military

0

0

1

0

Agriculture

0

0

0

0

(N=400)
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bank account in their home country.
But the numbers are significantly lower on the other indicators.
One-third (35%) still own a house (35%) and investments (34%) in
their home country, and a fifth (19%) still have a job to return to.
Western respondents are much less likely to have retained a house back
home, a reflection of their more permanent residence status. African
respondents are slightly less likely to have a foreign bank account.
Other than that, regional differences are minimal (Table 17).
Another measure is how often they return to their home country.
Very few appear to have cut all ties, with only 12% saying “never.” On
the other hand, only 16% return home often. Most do so on an irregular basis. Africans are far less likely to do so even though their destinations are much closer (Table 18).
Another way of assessing the likelihood of staying in South Africa is
by examining their developing ties to the country. As expected, old
(white) immigrants are far more likely to have permanent residence in
South Africa: nearly 80% of westerners versus only 56% of Africans
interviewed. The latter, who are predominantly post-1991 arrivals, face
considerable constraints on acquiring permanent residence. In fact, only
7% of the sample had work permits and had actually applied for permanent residence.
But how many temporary residents would opt for permanence if the
climate was more conducive? Of the work permit holders, almost half
(45%) said that they would want “to a large extent” to become a permanent resident. Other indicators also suggest a considerable interest in a
more permanent commitment to the country: 9% of the sample have
Table 17: Connections with Home Country (%)
In your home country, do you still:

Total

Western

African

Other

Own a house (% yes)

35

18

53

52

Have a bank account (% yes)

50

53

44

60

Have investments (% yes)

34

34

34

32

Have a job to return to (% yes)

19

15

21

36

Table 18: Frequency of Return to Home Country (%)
“How often do you return to your
home country?”
Total

Western

African

Other

Often

16

18

10

32

Occasionally

27

31

22

20

A few times

13

17

9

4

Once or twice

32

26

40

32

Never

12

8

18

12
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already applied for South African citizenship and one quarter (24%)
express a high level of desire to become a citizen. Similarly, one quarter
(25%) express a strong desire to retire in South Africa.
However, not everyone wishes to make such a commitment. This is
not surprising since the sample picked up two different “types” of postapartheid skilled foreign resident: individuals who are temporary residents by design or preference (e.g. employees of foreign companies or in
contract posts) and those who would prefer to immigrate to South
Africa permanently, but cannot.
African skilled workers are much more likely to express a strong
desire to become citizens (37%). Even though more than 60% express
some interest in obtaining citizenship, that does not always appear to
translate into a desire to stay for the rest of their lives. Just over onethird are interested in retiring in South Africa, and only 20% would
want to be buried there. Conversely, the older immigrants from the west
are considerably more likely to express interest in retiring and being
buried in South Africa. Almost one-half of the respondents (49%) said
they wanted to stay in South Africa longer than five years.
Skilled non-South Africans do still display a significant level of symbolic and patriotic ties with their home country. Eight-in-ten (80%)
respondents agreed that they were proud to be called a citizen of their
home country, and two-thirds (66%) agreed that citizenship in their
home country was an important part of their self-image. One half
(54%) want their children to be citizens of their home country, and
slightly less than half (46%) still feel that they have a duty to contribute to the development of their own country.
At the same time, it is important to note that these levels of assent
are substantially lower than those given by a sample of ordinary South
Africans about their South African patriotism.22 Europeans and North
America tended to be less enthusiastic about their identification with
their home countries, probably because they have been in South Africa
much longer. Continued identification with their home countries does
not seem to preclude assimilation within South African society. While
87% agreed that their fellow citizens continue to see themselves as citizens of their country, some 80% also agreed that they also “tend to
blend in with the people of South Africa and their culture.”

PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA
The survey results reveal that the skilled non-citizens are very satisfied
with their personal economic conditions in South Africa, their access to
health care and quality schooling, and the cost of living. This extends
across respondents from differing areas of origin (Table 19). The most
23
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important exception is the dissatisfaction of Europeans and North
Americans with the cost of living (64% dissatisfied or very dissatisfied).
The respondents were much less satisfied with the standard of services available in South Africa. By a wide margin, they are also dissatisfied with their level and share of taxation. Finally, there is an overwhelming concern about the lack of personal and family safety.
Regardless of where people perceive themselves to be now, a more
important question is where they think they will end up and why. Are
skilled non-citizens optimistic about their personal futures in South
Africa? Here there was a clear difference of opinion between western
and African migrants, between old and new immigrants (Table 20).
Most Africans feel that the various elements of their personal economic future in South Africa will continue to improve, in marked contrast to the pessimism of white non-citizens. These differences in attitude are remarkably similar to those between white and black South
Africans. Certainly, there is little reason why white non-citizens should
not have imbibed many of the same gloomy attitudes as their white
South African counterparts. The optimism of skilled Africans about the
Table 19: Perceptions of Life in South Africa
Total

Western

African

Other

Personal economic conditions

% satisfied/ very satisfied

Job

79

83

72

84

Prospects for professional advancement

69

49

70

72

Job security

63

68

55

67

Income

51

50

52

56

Cost of living

47

36

59

56

Relative share of taxes compared to others

20

18

25

8

Present level of taxation

15

13

18

12

Medical services

66

62

71

56

Education for children

45

39

55

40

The upkeep of public amenities

35

19

53

44

Customer service

35

18

55

44

Future of children in South Africa

18

11

27

16

Personal safety

15

13

18

12

Family’s safety

13

9

17

12

Taxation

Education and health care

Standard of services

Safety and security
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Table 20: Expected Improvements in Next Five Years
Total

Western

African

Other

Personal economic conditions

% satisfied/ very satisfied

Level of income

45

29

66

40

Job

42

22

69

40

Job security

39

17

67

40

Prospects for professional advancement

29

10

53

28

Cost of living

47

36

59

56

Present level of taxation

14

4

27

12

Relative share of taxes in comparison to others

11

1

22

12

Ability to find medical services for family

32

7

64

24

Ability to find a good school for children

28

7

56

20

Customer service

32

12

58

36

Upkeep of public amenities

31

12

56

40

Future of your children

24

9

45

16

Personal safety

26

10

48

16

Your family’s safety

25

10

45

16

Taxation

Education and health care

Standard of services

Safety and security

country and their place in it is a reminder to South African policy-makers that the South African experiment enjoys wide support amongst
skilled black Africans in the country.
A range of evidence from the media to systematic opinion surveys
reveal that South Africans are highly xenophobic and opposed to immigration, and that migrant workers and refugees often find themselves on
the receiving end of discrimination, intolerance and violence.23 The
question, therefore, is whether skilled non-citizens are in any way
immune from the stereotyping and hostility that is assumed to apply to
all foreigners. The survey seems to show that the professional and higher income status of this group shields them from much of the harsh
treatment meted out to ordinary foreign workers, immigrants or refugees
(Table 21).
Skilled migrants are certainly not unaware of the general negative
bias in the country. About one-quarter (28%) said that South Africans
hold very negative views – tellingly, 41% of skilled respondents from
Africa feel this way. But only small minorities feel that their co-workers
or others in their professions have a negative bias toward foreign
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residents. A smaller proportion (17%) felt that South Africans had a
negative view of people specifically from their home country - and
again, this proportion jumped to 36% among skilled Africans.
Perhaps more important, only 4% reported that they their personal
relations with South Africans were negative. Indeed, not one respondent chose the option “very negative.” Only very small numbers felt
that people from their home country were discriminated against by ordinary South Africans or the South African government, or that they personally were discriminated against (Table 22).
In some sense these are remarkably tolerant and accepting responses,
since the personal exposure to unpleasant incidents is not insignificant.
As Table 23 shows, nearly 60% of skilled non-citizens have been robbed
at some point, over a third have been harassed and one in five have
been physically assaulted.
One plausible explanation is that they compare their situation in
Table 21: Perceived Attitudes of South African Towards Immigrants
Total

Western

Attitudes towards foreign residents held by:

African

Other

% negative / very negative

People from South Africa

28

19

41

12

Co-workers

9

7

10

16

People in profession

6

5

6

16

Table 22: Immigrant Interaction with South Africans
Total

Western

African

Other

Do you generally have negative relations with
people from South Africa? (% positive)

96

98

95

88

To what extent are you personally treated fairly
by the SA government? (% fairly/ very fairly)

93

90

97

92

To what extent are you personally treated fairly
by South Africans? (% fairly/ very fairly)

95

98

92

96

To what extent are people from your home country
treated fairly by the SA government? (% fairly/ very fairly)

88

88

88

96

To what extent are people from your home country
treated fairly by South Africans? (% fairly/ very fairly)

92

99

81

100

Table 23: Personal Experience of Violence and Crime
% yes

Harassed

Total

Western

African

Other

35

29

45

16

Assaulted

18

15

23

12

Robbed

57

56

59

48
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South Africa favourably with conditions back home. Certainly this
seems to be the case when it comes to personal economic conditions;
most skilled non-citizens feel that they are better off in South Africa.
Only with regard to job security and levels of taxation do significantly
more people feel that they would be better off at home. That is hardly
surprising given current government policy towards the employment of
non-citizens. Skilled migrants from African countries are consistently
more likely to think that things are better in South Africa (Table 24).
The picture begins to change when we shift to comparing standards
of services. Differences according to region of origin become particularly
stark: with the majority of Europeans and North Americans saying these
things would be better at home, and at least two-thirds of African
respondents saying things are better in South Africa than in their home
countries.
Favorable evaluations of South Africa are at their lowest ebb with
regard to safety and security. Only 7% and 8% respectively feel that
their family safety and personal safety are better in this country. In contrast, 77% and 88% say these matters would be better at home. This
ought to be a sobering finding for South Africans. There is a widespread
perception that the rest of Africa, in particular, is a chaotic and violent
place. Yet, for skilled Africans, South Africa is a far more threatening
and dangerous environment.
Perhaps the most important question a skilled worker asks him or
herself when considering staying on in South Africa is whether their
life has improved as a result of the decision to come in the first place.
The survey reveals quite clearly that coming to South Africa has been a
positive career move for themselves and other fellow nationals (Table
25). Fully seven-in-ten (70%) say that the lives of the fellow nationals
they know who have come to South Africa have improved as a result of
the move. More significantly, 65% say that their own lives have
improved. Very small minorities feel their lives have worsened, with the
balance saying that things have remained as they were.
The general thrust of the analysis is that skilled non-citizens in
South Africa are generally far more interested in putting down roots in
South Africa than is permitted by current policy. What would happen if
the government were to adopt a more immigrant-friendly stance? Here
the statistical method known as Multiple Regression Analysis is useful
to answer the question: “what factor, or combination of factors, best
explains the length of desired stay in South Africa?” Or, more generally,
which of the factors included in the survey will ultimately determine
how long South Africa will hold onto the skilled foreign population
already inside the country?
The statistical analysis indicates that a very limited set of factors
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account for variations in the likelihood of skilled respondents’ of staying
in South Africa. It also reveals important differences between skilled
westerners and skilled Africans. With regard to the former, the most
important explanations (in a statistical sense) for a desire to stay in
South Africa is the degree to which they believe their personal economic prospects will improve in the next five years and the degree to
which they foresee improvements in the general state of services and
the future of their children in this period.
Thus, regardless of their satisfaction with their present personal conditions, or state of services, it was those people who felt that those things
would continue to improve who were significantly more likely to want to
stay in South Africa indefinitely (conversely, those who expected things
Table 24: Personal Experience of South Africa
Total
Personal Economic Conditions

Western

African

Other

% satisfied/ very satisfied

Cost of living

58

47

75

32

Job

57

46

75

36

Level of income

46

27

71

36

Job security

33

19

50

36

Level of taxation

16

11

22

16

Relative share of taxation

14

8

23

16

Medical services

36

11

71

32

Upkeep of public amenities

34

8

67

36

Customer service

33

9

61

48

Ability to find a good school

27

8

51

24

Future of your children

20

5

39

16

Personal safety

8

1

16

8

Family safety

7

1

16

4

Taxation

Standard of services

Education and health care

Safety and security

Table 25: Living Conditions in South Africa versus Home Country (%)
In general, would you say your life today is better, about
the same or worse than it was in your home country?
Total
Western

African

Other

Better / much better

65

62

70

52

About the same

25

25

22

36

Worse / much worse

9

8

8

12
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to get worse were significantly more likely to want to leave sooner).
Five other factors also were significant determinants of the length of
desired stay in South Africa: (a) the more people were dissatisfied with
present levels of tax and the relative share they were paying, the more
likely they were to want to exit the country in the next few years; (b) to
the extent that people felt that they were discriminated against by the
South African government, they were less likely to want to stay; (c) to
the extent that people felt they were personally doing better than others
in South Africa, they were more likely to want to stay; (d) the more
they are involved in professional associations in South Africa, the
longer they are likely to stay; and (e) to the extent that they felt that
South Africans had positive views of foreigners, they were also more
likely to stay.
In the case of skilled Africans, only one variable emerged as a significant predictor of desired length of stay in South Africa: they are significantly less likely to want to stay in the country to the extent that they
have negative relations with South Africans or feel they were discriminated against by ordinary South Africans and the South African government. Because the impact of discrimination was so strong in differentiating between those skilled Africans who wanted to leave South
Africa soon, and those who wanted to stay for an indefinite period, it is
important to ask what would happen if levels of discrimination/ intolerance against Africans could be reduced to zero.
To answer the question, these variables were removed from the equation. The result was that satisfaction with present personal economic
conditions became the sole predictor of skilled Africans’ desired length
of stay. In other words, by simply removing the effect of discrimination,
skilled Africans who are satisfied with the state of their personal economic conditions are significantly more likely to want to stay in South
Africa.

CONCLUSION

W

hile we need to be cautious about generalizing from
this sample of skilled foreign workers to all skilled
foreign workers in South Africa, the survey provides
us with many rich insights and propositions that can
be tested in the future with surveys of more systematically selected samples of foreign workers, or by other types of systematic
research.
“Brain drain” pessimism has focused mainly on the exit of skills from
South Africa with little focus on what South Africa can do to attract
more skilled workers from abroad or to keep those who stay here.
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Lurking behind much of this one-sided focus is the misguided assumption that national development and skills migration are incompatible.
In fact, the opposite is the case.
Skilled foreigners in South Africa (old and new migrants, Europeans
and Africans) – by wide margins – feel that their lives have been made
better by virtue of coming to the country. They are very satisfied with
their personal economic conditions and their access to schooling and
quality health care. They are also relatively optimistic about their personal prospects in South Africa over the next five years. However, they
do show concern over the quality of other types of services, taxes, and
especially the area of personal and family safety. More importantly, they
worry about the future of their children, and the prospects of declining
services and an even further deterioration in their security.
Continued economic prosperity and improvements in commercial
and public services and standards, such that they feel assured of their
children’s future, seem to be the most important factors in keeping these
skilled workers in the country. The recent economic recovery, as well as
the recent tax cuts in the new budget should presumably have important positive effects among this group.
In contrast, a whole range of potential issues, such as movements
toward an even more progressive taxation scheme, or a return of the
deteriorating currency, high interest rates and high inflation that was
experienced during the recession of 1998 could have the opposite
effect.
There are clearly very important changes afoot in the composition of
the skilled foreign workforce in South Africa. Compared to the situation just a decade ago when a similar survey would have been hard
pressed to find significant numbers of black skilled workers from the rest
of Africa, 41% of this sample were from Africa. This seems to suggest
that South Africa could capitalize on its comparative developmental
advantage over the rest of the continent as an attractive destination for
skilled workers.
It is interesting to compare the survey results with a companion survey of skilled South Africans. This reveals that, with a few exceptions,
skilled white South Africans are consistently more pessimistic about
South Africa (both in terms of present and future conditions in South
Africa, as well as comparisons of South Africa with other countries)
than are skilled Europeans and North Americans – the very people with
whom white South Africans would presumably identify. At the same
time, that survey demonstrated that few white South Africans have any
regular direct experience with the very countries that they list as their
most desired destinations. The skilled foreigner in South Africa at least
has the advantage of having seen what the grass looks like on both sides
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of the fence in forming their evaluations – and by and large, they prefer
the grass in South Africa.
At the moment, these African respondents are widely satisfied with
South Africa, and fairly optimistic about its future. What is required to
keep them is, first and foremost, a change in their treatment at the
hands of ordinary South Africans and their government. In this regard,
the problem of keeping skilled Africans appears to be the same problems confronting the formulation of a more rational immigration policy
in general: xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination against foreigners, particularly those from the rest of Africa.
Finally, is there anything from this research to guide efforts by business and government to increase the entrance of foreign skills into the
South African economy? While more systematic research would have to
be done among skilled people in other countries to assess their images of
South Africa, the views of those already there can provide an important
start. In answering the question often posed by puzzled South Africans
to skilled foreigners, “Who would want to move here?,” the survey suggests at least one answer.
Even with all the uncertainties and changes that accompany periods
of rapid political and economic transition, skilled people can make their
lives better. South Africa is a dynamic society with a substantial economy still capable of producing the quality of lifestyles that highly qualified people desire (whether they be from the First or Third Worlds). At
the same time, the results also suggest that without sending clear signals
that will increase certainty about the future, and without a sharp reduction in xenophobia and then communicating that reduction to skilled
people outside the country (especially to those living in Africa), it will
be increasingly hard to convince skilled people that there is any green
grass in South Africa.
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